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A Cost–Benefit Approach to the





The ‘Green Book’ and the recent EGRUP report support exchequer cost per job as a key input in
the ex-ante appraisal of individual applications for Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) and the
ex-post evaluation of the RSA scheme as a whole. In this paper, following a recommendation in
the House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee’s report on regional policy, the merits of
an alternative, explicitly cost–benefit, framework are outlined. This approach incorporates the
administration and compliance costs of the subsidy, costs at present ignored in RSA evaluation
studies. An optimal ex-ante appraisal rule is developed. This takes the form of a cost-per-job
ceiling, and a representative value is calculated for this figure.
JEL classification: H20.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1988, Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) became the main instrument of UK
regional policy. Since 1990, government guidelines have been issued for both the
ex-ante appraisal of individual applications for RSA and the ex-post evaluation of
this type of assistance programme. These guidelines have been published in the
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‘Green Book’ (HM Treasury, 1991) and the report of the interdepartmental
Evaluation Group on Regional and Urban Programmes (EGRUP) (HM Treasury,
1995). In addition, there have been two government-financed ex-post evaluations
of the operation of the RSA programme for the time periods 1980–84 and 1985–
88 (King, 1990; PA Cambridge Economic Consultants Ltd, 1993) and a further
evaluation is under consideration. It is therefore timely to review the appraisal and
evaluation criteria that have been adopted.
There is some ambiguity over the official rationale for UK regional policy in
general, and RSA in particular. The statutory authority for the RSA scheme comes
from section 7 of the Industry Development Act 1982. Whilst subsection 2 gives a
number of ‘purposes’ for which RSA can be used that have a developmental aim,
King (1990, p. 11) argues that the ‘principal objective of the scheme has come to
be seen as being defined by the constraint imposed by Subsection (1)’, which is
that RSA is restricted to situations where it is likely ‘to provide, maintain or
safeguard employment in any part of the assisted areas’. Therefore, although there
is some uncertainty concerning the underlying problem that RSA is attempting to
alleviate, a primary aim is the generation of additional assisted-area jobs, and it is
on this basis that RSA is evaluated.
II. PRESENT EX-ANTE APPRAISAL CRITERIA
The Green Book gives four ex-ante criteria for a project’s eligibility for RSA:
‘project additionality; project viability; national efficiency; and cost effectiveness
in achieving policy objectives’ (HM Treasury, 1991, p. 69). Project additionality
is the requirement that the project would not go ahead without assistance,
1 and
project viability that both the recipient firm and the project should be viable once
subsidies are taken into account. The national efficiency requirement is essentially
a cost–benefit hurdle, meaning ‘... that if all inputs and outputs could be correctly
valued and discounted at an appropriate rate the project should have a positive
NPV [net present value]’ (HM Treasury, 1991, p. 70). Finally, the cost-
effectiveness condition is simply the enforcement of an exchequer-cost-per-job
limit.
The additionality and national efficiency criteria together make up a coherent
cost–benefit appraisal scheme for a selective subsidy. These rules imply that the
government should only subsidise projects that are not viable when valued at
market prices but that are viable when all relevant inputs and outputs are valued at
the appropriate shadow prices.
2 Essentially, a cost–benefit evaluation of a
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particular project is similar to a commercial evaluation in that the project’s initial
costs should be set against the stream of future net benefits that the project will
produce, where the future net benefits are discounted back to the present using an
appropriate discount rate. The net present value (NPV) of a project is then the
difference between the discounted future net benefits and initial costs.
3 However,
cost–benefit differs from a commercial appraisal in the following ways. First, the
market prices for some inputs or outputs will be replaced by so-called shadow
prices where it is thought that the market does not properly value those inputs or
outputs.
4 Second, effects that are associated with the project that are not captured
through an existing market should be incorporated into the evaluation.
5
The fact that the joint imposition of the additionality and national efficiency
criteria implies a consistent cost–benefit evaluation is encouraging because the
EGRUP guidelines maintain that regeneration programmes should offset some
form of market failure (HM Treasury, 1995, p. 4) and cost–benefit is the
appropriate technique to use where market failure is present. It is precisely under
conditions of market failure that shadow prices will diverge from market prices.
However, the Green Book does not detail how shadow prices might differ from
market prices for the type of project aided by RSA and therefore does not specify
the nature of the market failure that RSA is designed to tackle. But one form of
market failure is ruled out explicitly in the Green Book: ‘Because of crowding-out
at the macroeconomic level, effects on employment ... should not be included as
benefits of projects in an efficiency test’ (HM Treasury, 1991, p. 70). This
recommendation appears to be based on the notion that market wages provide the
best measure of the opportunity cost of labour.
That a cost–benefit appraisal of a project designed to create regional jobs
cannot count these additional jobs as a benefit in their own right appears internally
inconsistent. In its ex-post evaluation of the RSA scheme as a whole, PA
Cambridge Economic Consultants Ltd (1993, p. 70) argues that ‘The market
failure which RSA is aiming to address is essentially the failure of regional labour
markets to adjust’, though its evaluation is undertaken following the Treasury
assumption that no additional UK jobs are created. The rationale for this Treasury
view is unclear. The official position on regional and urban regeneration
programmes is that crowding-out at the national level should be set at 100 per
cent, unless there are supply-side improvements (HM Treasury, 1995, p. 29). But
surely a central aim of RSA is to bring about such supply-side improvements.
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Again, if there is no labour market failure, what is the identity of the market
failure that RSA is designed to counteract? There is a hint in the Green Book (HM
Treasury, 1991, p. 70) that failure in the capital market can be used to support
RSA applications, though the spatial aspect of this market failure is not identified.
Even if one did not believe that national employment gains could be made through
the application of regional policy, the notion that the government has a policy to
redistribute employment regionally implies that, at the margin, it values jobs in
some parts of the country more highly than jobs in others. These differential
weights should be incorporated in the cost–benefit calculation.
The additionality and national efficiency criteria amount to a cost–benefit
requirement; the viability and cost effectiveness criteria yield an additional cost-
per-job condition. This is that the RSA payment should be the minimum consistent
with the project’s viability and that, with the subsidy at this level, the project’s
exchequer cost per job must fall below some unspecified ceiling. Project cost per
job is calculated as the gross public expenditure per net job created. At face value,
this is a very partial measure as it only incorporates the public sector cost of the
subsidy. No explicit account is taken, for example, of private sector compliance
costs, and no attempt is made to discover the resource costs of the subsidy. Of
equal importance, there is no discussion of the way in which the cost-per-job limit
is fixed. Clearly, the lower the cost-per-job ceiling, the fewer projects will be
aided, but there is no consideration of the determination of the optimal number of
aided projects.
III. A CONSISTENT COST–BENEFIT APPROACH
In short, at present, an aided project must clear both a cost–benefit and a cost-per-
job hurdle. As currently formulated, both of these measures are flawed. Also, there
is normally no possible trade-off between them: a project with a high NPV will be
rejected if it does not generate enough jobs, and similarly a project that generates
jobs at a low exchequer cost will be rejected if it does not yield a positive NPV.
6
However, elements of these two measures can be combined to form a consistent,
coherent and operational method that could be used as a basis for both the ex-ante
appraisal of individual RSA applications and the ex-post evaluation of the RSA
programme as a whole. The central aim of this paper is to trace out the
implications of adopting such a strategy. This strategy is to maintain the broad
cost–benefit approach, but to amend it in two ways. First, additional employment
should be valued directly as a benefit or, equivalently, some or all labour should
be costed at a shadow wage below the market wage. Second, the private
compliance, public administration and tax-raising costs involved with conducting
and financing the policy should be incorporated explicitly in the evaluation
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(Swales, 1989, 1995a and 1995b). This is an extension and refinement of the way
in which cost–benefit techniques are used at present in the appraisal and
evaluation of regional policy and is offered as a response to a recommendation of
the House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee in its recent report on
regional policy (House of Commons, 1995).
7
A project uses capital and labour, K and L, to produce an output, Q, per period
for n periods. Taking the output price as numeraire and the market rentals for
capital and labour as w and r, the additionality condition implies that, for the
project to attract a subsidy,
(1) Q Lw Kr - - < 0 .
If the project passes this criterion, it will not go ahead without the subsidy, and the
viability condition is that this subsidy, S, should be the minimum required for the
project to be profitable for the firm. Thus
(2) S Lw Kr Q R C n c = + - + ( )
where Cc is the firm’s total compliance costs (the initial cost of the subsidy

















so that Rn is the NPV of £1 per period discounted over n periods at a discount rate
i. The viability condition therefore sets the subsidy level equal to the discounted
value of future losses plus the firm’s compliance costs. Finally, the national
efficiency (cost–benefit) criterion can be identified. This should be based upon the
net increase in activity in the region. This is made up of three elements: the direct,
displacement and multiplier effects. The direct effect is the increase in activity in
the aided project. Displacement is where regional activity in existing plants is
reduced as a result of competition from the aided project. Such competition can
occur in either the commodity or factor markets. Third, the multiplier effect
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measures any increase in regional activity through intermediate input linkage and
Keynesian consumption multiplier processes.
9
Before moving to the full cost–benefit appraisal, it is necessary to confront a
potentially troublesome issue. This is that civil servants make mistakes when
appraising the profitability of applicant projects. The most recent ex-post
evaluation of the RSA programme estimates that the degree of ‘additionality’
associated with RSA is only 48 per cent. That is to say, 52 per cent of the
employment in assisted projects would have gone ahead anyway without RSA
payments (PA Cambridge Economic Consultants Ltd, 1993, p. 46). There is a
clear problem of asymmetric information with discretionary subsidies which is
difficult to analyse fully (Rasmusen, 1994). The approach I adopt is extremely
simplistic. For all projects judged by the civil service to require a given subsidy, a
proportion, a, will be additional and will require the precise estimated subsidy to
proceed, whereas the remaining proportion, 1–a, are non-additional and would
have gone ahead anyway without any subsidy. Under these conditions, the cost–
benefit condition becomes
(3) NPV Q Lw Kr R C C S n a a c c = - - - + - - ‡ a b t b t ( * ) ( ) 1 0
where w* is the shadow wage, t is the proportionate cost of raising taxation, Ca is
the government’s project administration costs, ba and bc are the proportions of the
administration and compliance costs that are related to monitoring the project’s
progress, rather than presenting and evaluating the initial project submission, and
K K K K m d = + - ,
L L L L m d = + -
and Q Q Q Q m d = + -
where the subscripts d and m identify inputs and output associated with the
displacement and multiplier effects respectively. Expression (3) implies that the
government should accept all projects that show a positive NPV using this
procedure.
It will be useful to make a number of preliminary observations on the details of
this approach. First, I have incorporated into the cost–benefit analysis the cost of
raising the taxation to cover the direct subsidy payments and the government
administration costs. This reflects the position taken in the Green Book that
expenditure on non-additional projects ‘would be an unacceptable use of public
funds, providing income transfers, the financing of which would impose
distortionary costs on the economy’ (HM Treasury, 1991, p. 69). However, the
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incorporation of tax-raising costs is not standard procedure in UK public sector
cost–benefit evaluation and, as we shall see later, there is no official figure for the
administrative and distortionary effects of raising taxation. The reader can set the
value of t equal to zero if he or she wishes and this has no qualitative effect on the
analysis.
Second, equations (2) and (3) embody the assumption that all the various costs
occur at the beginning of the project. This is not strictly true. For example, many
projects receive RSA in stages, which clearly spreads all the administration,
compliance and tax-raising costs more evenly over time. Ca(1+t), Cc and St are
therefore more properly thought of as the NPV of the stream of administration and
compliance costs over the whole life of the project.
Third, in equation (3), the only input with a shadow price that differs from the
market price is labour. In particular, the capital market is taken to be both
perfectly competitive and integrated across space. Although this is a conventional
assumption in regional analysis, its use might be more debatable in the appraisal
of discretionary subsidies because of information asymmetries implicit in the
capital market which a discretionary subsidy could be designed to counter
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Equation (3) can be adjusted in a straightforward
way to incorporate as many inputs as are required and each can be entered with a
shadow price different from its market price. However, later in this paper —
where the cost–benefit appraisal is linked to the cost-per-job ceiling — the
primacy of the shadow wage on labour is crucial.
Fourth, expression (3) includes only a proportion of the administration and
compliance costs. This equation is used to determine the rules that civil servants
should follow when deciding whether to accept or reject an application. At this
point, the initial administration and compliance costs associated with making and
appraising the application are sunk. They must be met even if the application is
turned down and therefore should play no part in the ex-ante criteria. Only the
proportion of administration and compliance costs related to monitoring the
project are included in the NPV calculation.
IV. THE COST-PER-JOB CEILING
There are strong arguments in favour of adopting a cost–benefit approach. Cost–
benefit is a practical evaluation technique that is firmly rooted in sound economic
principles. It is not esoteric or obscure. It is routinely taught in undergraduate
economics degrees and its strengths and weaknesses are therefore very well
known. Moreover, as a framework generally recommended by the Treasury for the
evaluation of public expenditure projects, it is familiar to administrators in the
civil service. However, a counter-argument might be that such a procedure would
be impractical to implement: civil servants do not have the time to undertake a full
cost–benefit analysis on each project seeking support. However, for a standard
project that runs unaltered for a fixed number of years and has labour as the onlyFiscal Studies
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input valued at a shadow price, it is possible to derive a very simple decision rule
from the cost–benefit criterion outlined above. Perhaps surprisingly, this decision
rule takes the form of an exchequer-cost-per-job ceiling.
I make the conventional assumption that the additional activity generated by
the multiplier process and displaced activity in competing firms is unaided and
makes no excess profits, so that
(4) Q L w K r j j j = +    where      j m d = , .
Substituting this expression, together with equation (2), into equation (3) gives the
following decision rule:
(5) NPV L d m w w R C C n a a c c = - + - - + - - a t b b a ( )( )( *) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1
- + ‡ S( ) a t 0
where d is the ratio of displaced to subsidised employment and m is the
employment multiplier.
Expression (5) can be used to derive the welfare-maximising subsidy limit,
Smax, for any particular project. If this figure is divided by the net employment
increase, the result is the exchequer-cost-per-job ceiling, rmax, which I wish to
express as a proportion of the wage. For consistency with the present Green Book
guidelines, the net employment increase in this context takes into account
displacement but not multiplier effects (HM Treasury, 1991, pp. 70–1). Why the
Treasury does not incorporate multiplier impacts in this calculation is unclear. It
will also simplify the exposition, and allow a presentation that is consistent with
data availability, if the administration and compliance costs are given as
proportional to the total subsidy payment.
The marginal project is one in which the NPV equals zero. Rearranging the
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This means that a project should attract RSA if and only if the minimum subsidy
consistent with viability produces an exchequer cost per job that is less than a
proportion, rmax, of the wage. It must be stressed that this is not an ad hoc
measure, loosely justified by the rationing of government expenditure. Rather, it is
a decision rule, solidly based on cost–benefit principles, which takes into account
the costs of the subsidy policy to both the firm and the taxpayer.
rmax will vary across different types of project, so that civil servants would
require some form of ready reckoner to determine the appropriate cost-per-job
ceiling. However, it will be useful to venture an estimate of a representative value
of rmax for assisted-area projects in the UK. It is perhaps surprising, given that
there have recently been two major evaluations of RSA, that the values of many of
the key parameters required for such a calculation are still a matter of conjecture.
The parameter values required to calculate the cost-per-job ceiling are given in
Table 1. The calculation is made for a project that will run unchanged for 10
years, so that n = 10. This is the time horizon recommended by the EGRUP report
(HM Treasury, 1995, p. 31) for assessing the final impacts of regenerative
programmes. In the Green Book, the proposed rate of discount for public sector
projects in general is 6 per cent, though for appraising industrial assistance cases,
a rate of at least 8 per cent is recommended (HM Treasury, 1991, p. 70).
However, in the most recent ex-post evaluation of the RSA programme, 6 per cent
is used and, for consistency with this study, I adopt i = 0.06, which gives a value
for Rn equal to 7.80.
10 There appear to be no recent figures for the public
administration costs of RSA. King (1990, p. 17) reports values taken from a DTI
exercise for the financial year 1981–82 (Coates and Appleton, 1983), suggesting a
public administration cost for RSA of 5 per cent of the value of the grant, so that
ca = 0.05. There are apparently no estimates of the firm’s compliance costs, cc, for
RSA. However, Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick (1989) claim that, for general
taxation, the private compliance costs are, on average, twice the size of the public
administration costs. In the absence of more reliable information, this is the
assumption adopted here. Therefore cc = 0.10. The proportion of the
administration cost that is spent on monitoring, rather than on the initial appraisal,
is estimated by King (1990, p. 17), using data from Coates and Appleton (1983),
as 40 per cent, and again, lacking other information, I have
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TABLE 1
Parameter Values Required for Calculating the Optimal
Exchequer-Cost-Per-Job Ceiling, r rmax
Parameter Value Source
a 0.48 PA Cambridge Economic Consultants Ltd, 1993
ba 0.40 Coates and Appleton, 1983
bc 0.40 Coates and Appleton, 1983
k 0.65 Ashcroft and Swales, 1982
Hare, 1975
t 0.20 Sandford et al., 1989
ca 0.05 Coates and Appleton, 1983
cc 0.10 Coates and Appleton, 1983
Sandford et al., 1989
i 0.06 HM Treasury, 1991
PA Cambridge Economic Consultants Ltd, 1993
m 0.30 PA Cambridge Economic Consultants Ltd, 1993
n 10 HM Treasury, 1995
used the same proportion for compliance costs: ba = bc = 0.40. As argued already,
PA Cambridge Economic Consultants Ltd (1993) estimates that only 48 per cent
of RSA expenditure is on ‘additional’ projects, giving a value of a = 0.48. The
employment multiplier is made up of two parts: backward linkages and
consumption multiplier effects. PA Cambridge Economic Consultants Ltd (1993)
estimates that the linkage effect increases employment by 20 per cent and that the
consumption multiplier increases it by a further 10 per cent, so that m = 0.30. The
cost of raising taxation, t, is more difficult to determine. In the Green Book, there
is no discussion of the incorporation of the cost of raising public revenue into
appraisal decisions. On this basis, t should equal zero. However, I set t = 0.20,
which reflects the sum of the estimated collection costs (0.04) and distortionary
costs (0.16) of general taxation given in Sandford et al. (1989). Finally, and
perhaps most speculatively, a value needs assigning to the shadow wage, k.
Ashcroft and Swales (1982) and Hare (1975) give estimates of the regional
shadow wage for the 1970s for Development Areas and Scotland respectively of
between 60 and 70 per cent of the market wage. Therefore my ‘best guess’ is k =
0.65, though this figure is clearly dated and subject to much uncertainty. These
parameter values taken together give a cost-per-job ceiling of 2.45. That is to say,
with a discretionary regional policy, the government should be prepared to pay aEvaluation of Regional Selective Assistance
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maximum subsidy per employee of over twice the annual wage for a project that
will operate unchanged for 10 years.
11
If exchequer cost per job is a key criterion for the ex-ante appraisal of
individual RSA applications, then it is important to argue over the appropriate
level of the cost-per-job ceiling. At present, this ceiling is not public knowledge.
12
The value of the cost-per-job ceiling is critical because, as rmax increases, the
number of projects accepted for RSA will rise: the minimum necessary subsidy
required for commercial viability will lie below the cost-per-job ceiling for a larger
number of projects. As we have seen, setting this ceiling at a sensible level
requires knowledge of the value of a number of parameters, some of which, such
as the multiplier, displacement level, duration of the project and shadow wage,
vary across plants and locations and all of which are subject to a degree of
uncertainty. The parameters used in equation (6) can be separated into three sets.
First, the four parameters associated with the administration and compliance cost
(ca, cc, ba and bc) have a minimal role in determining the cost-per-job ceiling.
Second, the value of the additionality rate, the multiplier, the discount rate and the
cost of taxation (a, m, i and t) all have a small but perceptible impact on the
calculation of rmax. If we double the value of any of these parameters, the absolute
size of the cost-per-job ceiling would change by an amount between 0.5 and 1.0.
Finally, rmax is very sensitive to changes in the number of years over which the
project runs (n) and especially the value of the shadow wage (k).
V. EX-POST EVALUATION
The recent ex-post evaluations of the RSA scheme as a whole (King, 1990; PA
Cambridge Economic Consultants Ltd, 1993) concentrate almost exclusively on
identifying the average exchequer cost per additional assisted-area job generated
by the programme.
13 However, a method similar to that outlined above could be
used to develop a superior cost–benefit approach. The key difference between the
discussion of ex-ante project appraisal and the ex-post programme evaluation is as
follows. In considering ex-ante project appraisal, I have been concerned with
identifying an optimal decision rule for civil servants to follow, whereas with ex-
                                                                                                                             
11In the ex-post official evaluations, the employment gain is measured in terms of present value job years. This
implies discounting the future stream of employment over 10 years back to the base year at a discount rate of 6 per
cent. When this measure is used, the subsidy ceiling per present value job year is 31 per cent of the wage.
12A referee notes that to make the cost-per-job ceiling public knowledge would weaken the position of officials
negotiating with companies for the minimum amount of assistance necessary to secure projects on a financially
viable basis. However, a lack of a clear cost-per-job ceiling renders an application for RSA funding more uncertain
for private firms, particularly those making their first application (Allen, Begg, McDowell amd Walker, 1986;
Swales, 1989).
13Surprisingly, the exchequer-cost-per-job measure used in the ex-post evaluations differs from that employed in the
ex-ante appraisals in that the estimate of additional employment incorporates multiplier effects and the exchequer
costs are adjusted for tax clawbacks.Fiscal Studies
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post programme evaluation, one is attempting to assess an actual scheme that is
likely to have been operated suboptimally. This means that the ex-post cost–
benefit evaluation should incorporate all the administration and compliance costs
associated with the programme. These include the initial application costs for both
successful and unsuccessful firms and the civil service costs of the scrutiny of
such applications. These costs play no part in the generation of the optimal cost-
per-job ceiling for ex-ante project appraisals.
VI. CONCLUSION
I wish to argue strongly that cost–benefit is the best existing framework for the
evaluation of regional policy. It is a technique firmly based in welfare theory, is
flexible to use and is specifically designed to deal with situations where market
failure exists and where costs and benefits are distributed over time. Against this,
the existing exchequer-cost-per-job approach has an instrumental, administrative
basis and is arbitrary and inconsistent. However, the strength of cost–benefit is not
that it can provide cast-iron decision rules for running regional policy. Rather, it is
that it gives us a set of concepts, a coherent language, with which to constructively
discuss such a policy. There is a low level of agreement about the way in which
the UK economy operates over space, and, given the sparsity of spatially
disaggregate data, differing viewpoints are likely to persist. Therefore discussion
of regional policy should consist of broad and wide-ranging debate, not the
minutiae of fine tuning. Cost–benefit draws attention to the key system-wide
variables that are central to a rational discussion of regional policy. On the other
hand, the recent cost-per-job evaluations of RSA, whilst strong on detail, fail to
provide a comparable focus.
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